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REGULATORY OVERREACHING: WHY THE FCC
IS EXCEEDING ITS AUTHORITY IN
IMPLEMENTING A PHASE-IN PLAN FOR DTV
TUNERS
I. INTRODUCTION
As digital television progresses with higher quality and assumes a
greater role in the broadcasting world,1 analog television is on its way out.
2
While much of the technological progress is consumer-driven, there are
still instances in which the government or its regulatory agencies have
stepped in to encourage and assist the public's progression to newer, more
advanced technologies through a process aptly termed "technology
forcing."3  Promoting the public interest through "technology forcing"
often requires a delicate balance between industrial and economic progress
on the one hand, and embedded costs and vested commercial interests on
the other. Certainly, the government has a legitimate interest in the goals
of facilitating such transitions.4 However, this process should not be done
arbitrarily and capriciously by passing laws, which, while purporting to
achieve a greater good, opens up the floodgates for detriment.
One such instance where a government agency, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), has stepped in to facilitate the
move towards advanced technology in the name of public interest, is in the
1. See In the Matter of Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broadcast
Stations, Amendments to Part 76 of the Commission's Rules, 13 FCC Rcd. 15,092, 15,105 (1998)
[hereinafter Transmission Carriage Report].
2. A. Michael Noll, A Misguided Campaign for Over-the-Air Digital TV, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16,
2002, at S12. Noll argues that over-the-air-television is dying; most consumers do not really care
about broadcast digital television, as they rely on DVDs and DBS (Direct Broadcast Satellite).
Because of this, "the remaining few viewers of over-the-air broadcast television may simply turn
off altogether rather than purchase a costly new TV receiver to watch the same programming."
Id.
3. See Encouraging Capital Formation in Key Sectors of the Economy: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy, Technology, and Economic Growth of the
Committee on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002).
4. See id.
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realm of broadcast television.5  Until the 1950s, almost all television
programming was broadcast over the VHF television band.6 Because the
frequencies are limited, the VHF television spectrum, consisting of a total
of twelve channels, had become exhausted.7 To promote growth of the
television broadcast industry and to benefit the consumers, the FCC
responded to this spectrum scarcity by opening a total of seventy new
channels in the UHF band for broadcasters.8
Despite the new spectrum availability from the UHF band, the new
programming available to consumers did not substantially increase. 9 The
reason behind this was a combination of factors, including a lack of
channels available to the public, poor quality of over-the-airwaves
broadcasts, absence of educational television, and something termed the
"vicious cycle."' 10 The "vicious cycle" was a phenomenon by which
consumers did not have the television equipment (decoders) to receive the
UHF channels and, thus, no incentive to purchase such equipment absent
enticing UHF programming." Meanwhile, faced with the fact that
consumers did not have the necessary reception equipment, broadcasters
refrained from constructing UHF stations.'
2
Market forces acting alone could not readily solve the problem faced
by the viewers and the broadcasting industry. As a result, in 1963,
Congress stepped in by enacting the All-Channel Receiver Act
("ACRA"),' 3 which gave the FCC the necessary authority to remedy the
non-use of the UHF spectrum for television programming. 14 The FCC,
pursuant to its authority granted under ACRA, passed regulations requiring
that television receivers include the capability to receive both VHF and
UHF channels.' 5  This intervention eliminated the "vicious cycle" and
brought the UHF television into contemplated use.
16
5. See In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the
Conversion to Digital Television, 17 FCC Red. 15,978, 15,978-79, (2002) [hereinafter Digital
Television Order].
6. See All-Channel Television Receivers and Deintermixture, Hearings Before the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong. 2 (1962).
7. See id at 8.
8. See id at 2.




13. All-Channel Receiver Act of 1962, Pub.L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §303(s)).
14. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,990.
15. See id. at 15,989-90 n.45.
16. Idat 15,990.
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The FCC claims that a similar "vicious cycle" exists today with the
advent of Digital Television ("DTV"). 17 DTV is a mode of translating
broadcast signals in digital form as opposed to the traditional analog
form. 8 Today, as in the 1960s, consumer equipment is generally incapable
of realizing the full potential of new broadcasting.' 9 Due to these new
advancements in technology, ACRA has resurfaced again, and so has the
FCC in its regulation of television receivers.
2 0
On August 8, 2002, the FCC amended its own rules and adopted a
requirement that new broadcast television-receiving equipment have the
capability to receive DTV signals.2 1 It prescribed a gradual phase-in of
digital tuners in television-receiving devices over a span of five years.2
According to the FCC schedule, by July 1, 2007, all new television
receivers and "TV Interface Devices [videocassette recorders (VCRs),
digital versatile disk (DVD) players/recorders, etc.], 2 3 that are shipped in
interstate commerce or manufactured in the United States must have the
capability of receiving DTV signals.24 Essentially, this means that
television sets not equipped with the capability of receiving DTV signals
will become obsolete once analog programming disappears and television
broadcasts become all-digital. The FCC relied on ACRA to enact this
regulation, despite the fact that forty years had elapsed and many other
developments had occurred since ACRA was enacted in 1962.25
This Comment argues that the FCC does not have the requisite power
under ACRA to pass regulations forcing television receiver manufacturers
to equip the prescribed products with DTV tuners and decoders. Section II
provides background on DTV, the enactment of ACRA, and the application
of ACRA in the past, as well as to the current DTV transition. Section III
discusses why neither the legislative history, the caselaw, nor the general
market tendencies warrant the FCC's intervention In regulating the DTV
transition. Furthermore, contrary to the FCC's sophistry, the conditions
existing at the time of ACRA's enactment simply do not exist today. This
Comment will also propose several alternative undeclared motivations that
might have prompted the FCC to exceed its scope and adopt ACRA.
17. Id.
18. Idat 15,979.
19. See id. at 15,980.
20. See Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,980.
21. Id. at 15,979; see also discussion infra Part II.A-B.
22. See id. at 15,996-97.
23. Id. at 15,996.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 15,987-89.
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Finally, this Comment will conclude that the expansion of ACRA under the
auspice of facilitating this particular technological advance in the digital
television broadcasting arena is not a valid exercise of the FCC's limited
power under ACRA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is DTV?
The Digital Television ("DTV") standard is the implementation of a
digital, rather than analog, transmission of the broadcast signal.2 6  It is
assumed that an ordinary consumer would likely prefer digital transmission
over analog because, as the FCC asserts in its report, the conversion of
television broadcast from analog to digital "is generally associated with
greatly improved sound and picture quality in the high definition and with
better and more flexible reception in the standard mode.,
27
The digital transmission itself is composed of a stream of bits,
referred to as "data packets, 28 which can be any kind of information,
including video, audio, or data.2 9 These data packets are identified with
"headers and descriptors" 30 indicating their content, which allows for
different types of information (e.g., audio and data) to be intermixed within
the same stream.31
The digital television transmission system and related standards were
established by the Advanced Television Systems Committee ("ATSC").
32
26. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,978-79.
27. Transmission Carriage Report, supra note 1, at 15,105. Still, quality might vary from
"system to system," and it is possible that more channels would be offered without any significant
enhancements in the quality of sound and picture due to variations in modulating techniques. Id.
28. Id. at 15,104 n.64.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (Data amounts required to transmit a digital picture vary with the amount of motion
in the picture.).
32. Transmission Carriage Report, supra note 1, at 15,103.
The ATSC standards are generally discussed as including 18 scanning formats,
although technically 36. The 18 formats are described in the Commission's Fifth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in MM Docket No. 87-268, 11 FCC Rcd
6235, 6239 and in Annex A, Table 3 of the "ATSC Digital Television Standard"
Doc. A/53. These specific formats were not incorporated into the Commission's
digital television broadcast standards. See Fourth Report and Order in MM Docket
No. 87-268, 11 FCC Red 17771, 17790. There are six video formats which are
"high definition television": 1080-line by 1920-pixel formats at all picture rates
(24, 30 and 60 pictures per second) and the 720-line by 1280-pixel formats at these
same picture rates. All these formats have a 16:9 aspect ratio. The remaining
twelve video formats, while representing some significant improvements over
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The ATSC is an organization representing various facets of the video
industry, including broadcasters, cable operators, and equipment
manufacturers.33 It has set out the standards for digital components of the
transmission34 consisting of the "video/audio layer, compression layer,
transport layer, and the transmission layer."35  At the top of the ATSC
hierarchy is the "uncompressed digital signal in one of the various
video/audio formats," which allows for a highly-mixed, high-quality
transmission of various pictures, sound, and data, but not necessarily in
36consistent proportions. The uncompressed digital signal is compressed in
the next level, called the "compression layer." 37 At this level, the elementary
stream from the uncompressed level becomes compressed into a "bitstream
with a lower data rate."3 8 The compression bitstream is then converted into a
"transport layer 39 by being "packetized and multiplexed with other
bitstreams. 40 Finally, the lowest layer is called the "transmission layer.
''4
Presently, the ATSC has established standards for two modes of
modulation of the digital signal utilizing vestigial sideband modulation
("VSB"). 42 While there were some debates as to which standard should be
used,43 in January 2001, the FCC, as part of its periodic review, adopted the
"8-VSB" as the official modulation system.
44
analog NTSC, are not high definition television. They are referred to as "standard
definition television." These are the 480-line by 704-pixel formats in 16:9
widescreen and 4:3 aspect ratios, at the picture rates listed above, and 480-line by
640-pixel format at a 4:3 aspect ration.
Id. at 15,103-04 n.63.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 15,103-04.
35. Id. at 15,104.
36. Id.
37. Transmission Carriage Report, supra note 1, at 15,104.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 15,104.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 15,104. In the transmission level, the multiplexed bitstream is "modulated onto a
radio frequency ("RF") carrier." Id.
42. Id. "VSB is a form of amplitude modulation in which one sideband of the main
modulated signal and a small part of the other sideband of the same signal are transmitted. The
current analog television standard also uses VSB." Id. at 15,104 n.66. The two modes are 16
VSB and 8 VSB. Id. at 15,104.
43. Richard E. Wiley, Communications Law in 2001: A New Environment, in 19TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS: POLICY & REGULATION 7, 41-42 (PLI Intell. Prop.
Course, Handbook Series No. G-684, 2001). The Grand Alliance, a consortium of rival interests in
the technology industry formed in 1993 recommends the "8-VSB" standard, while another group of
broadcasters headed by the Sinclair Broadcast Group argued that the preferred modulation technique
is "COFDM." Id.
44. Id. at 42.
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B. The FCC Regulatory Program
The FCC regulation in the realm of DTV decoders did not come as a
surprise. Rather, the FCC has long been conducting hearings and
investigations on DTV conversion to ensure its success. The first of these
reviews took place on March 6, 2000.4
Initially, the FCC established a DTV Table of Allotments, 46 which
assigned a second channel to all full-power television stations.4 7 The idea
was that, while it may be too expensive for a television station to buy another
channel solely for digital transmission, afree assignment would facilitate the
transition to a digital standard.4 s Thus, while this additional channel would
be used for a digital broadcast, the television station would simultaneously
broadcast in analog format on the original channel.49  Ideally, once the
transition was completed, the station would relinquish and cease
broadcasting its inital analog channel. However, the broadcaster may choose
retain the original channel and relinquish the newly-assigned one.50
According to the 1997 Budget Act passed by Congress, the FCC is required
to reclaim, market by market, the analog channel from television stations by
December 31, 2006, "unless fewer than 85% of the station's viewers can
receive the broadcaster's digital service either off-air or through satellite or
cable television. '51  During this transitional period, the television stations
will broadcast both analog and digital signals.52 At the end of the transition,
45. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,979.
46. Wiley, supra note 43, at 37.
47. Id.




51. Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Transmission Carriage Report, supra note 1, at 15,099. This report
(1) provides one 6 MIHz channel for each DTV channel; (2) limits the initial
eligibility for DTV licenses to existing full-power broadcasters; (3) requires DTV
licensees to provide at least one free digital programming service that is at least
comparable In resolution to today's service and aired during the same time periods
that their analog channel is broadcasting; (4) allows licensees to provide ancillary
or supplemental services that do not derogate the mandated, free over-the-air
program service; (5) gives broadcasters the discretion as to how much, if any, high
definition television programming they will transmit; (6) licenses DTV and NTSC
television facilities under a single, paired license; (7) states the Commission's
intent to give special relief to noncommercial broadcasters to assist in their
transition to DTV, including providing them six years within which to construct
DTV facilities; (8) allows equipment manufacturers at this time to determine which
video formats DTV equipment will receive based on market and consumer demand;
(9) postpones a decision whether to impose labeling requirements on receiver
manufacturers; and (10) declines to limit the sale of NTSC-only display devices in
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the broadcast licensee will cease transmitting the analog signal and will
return the proscribed 6 MHz of spectrum to the government. 53 Once the FCC
recovers the entire analog spectrum, 108 MHz in total, the frequencies will
likely (and profitably) be sold for commercial purposes, such as wireless and
Internet services.54
The FCC's Fifth Report and Order contains "[t]he rules governing the
transition from analog to digital broadcasting .... 55 Despite the difficulties
in the transition, as of December 2001 more than 200 DTV stations were
already delivering digital broadcast.56  Nevertheless, due to transitional
difficulties, the FCC had to postpone the May 10, 2000 auction date for the
spectrum from channels 60-69 (upper 700 Mhz band) five different times.57
While the DTV conversion was being considered, the FCC heard
arguments by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the
North American Broadcasters Association (NABA).58 NAB, NABA, and
other concerned parties argued that DTV receivers were unavailable in the
market in "sufficient volume to support a rapid transition to an all-digital
broadcast television service., 59  In response to this argument, the FCC
sought feedback on what impact requiring a DTV decoder would play on
the difficulties encountered in the DTV conversion. 60 Upon requesting this
information, the FCC also addressed the issue of cost to consumers,
recognizing that DTV components were expensive, and that "it would not
be economically feasible at this point to include DTV capability in smaller
screen receivers.,, 6 1 Due to the pricing issue, the FCC decided to phase in
the requirement over time so as to "take advantage of the declining costs
associated with increasing electronics manufacturing volumes. 62
In establishing its regulatory strategy, the FCC has relied heavily on
feedback by interested parties such as Paxson, Motorola, Association for
the future. (citation omitted).
Id. at 15,099 n.42,.
53. See 47 U.S.C. §309(j)(14)(C) (2000) (concerning the reversion of the analog television
spectrum to the Government).
54. See generally Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698-746 MHz Spectrum Band
(Television Channels 52-59), 16 FCC Rcd. 7278 (2001) (discussing the proposed method of
reallocation for the 698-746 MHz spectrum band).
55. Transmission Carriage Report, supra note 1, at 15,099.
56. Wiley, supra note 43, at 36.
57. Id. at 38.
58. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,981.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 15,980.
61. Id. at 15,981.
62. Id.
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Maximum Service Television, Inc. (MSTV), NAB, NABA, and
Association of Local Television Stations, Inc. (ALTV).63 On the other
hand, it has also confronted vigorous opposition from Consumer
Electronics Association (CEA) and Thomson Multimedia, Inc.
(Thomson). 64 CEA and Thomson oppose the DTV tuner requirement on
the grounds that it would "seriously impede the DTV transition through
consumer reaction to the significantly higher prices of television sets that
,,65 o ncwould result during the first few years. Instead of enacting this DTV
phase-In regulation, CEA argues that the FCC should simply let the natural
market forces guide the transition.66 Further, CEA argues that a DTV tuner
requirement would disrupt the normal market-incentive system where
67consumer desires dictate the features offered by manufacturers. Instead,
manufacturers would be coerced into providing consumers with features
they do not want at prices they might not be able to afford.68
Despite the arguments urging the FCC to abstain from regulating,69 it
declined to delay application of the DTV tuner requirement. Asserting its
actions to be motivated by a desire to provide consumers with the
capability to receive the digital signal, speed up the transition to the digital
standard,70  and to effectuate the intent of ACRA, the FCC imposed the
following phase-in schedule:
Receivers with screen sizes 36" and above-50% of a
responsible party's units must include DTV tuners effective July
1, 2004; 100% of such units must include DTV tuners effective
July 1, 2005;
Receivers with screen sizes 25" to 35"-50% of a responsible
party's units must include DTV tuners effective July 1, 2005;
100% of such units must include DTV tuners effective July 1,
2006;
63. Id. at 15,981-84. These organizations, in one way or another, are primarily concerned
with supporting and providing various services to the broadcasting industry.
64. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,984. CEA represents over 1,000 corporate
members involved in all facets of audio, video, and wireless electronics, as well as
communication and information technology. Thomson is a provider of technologies, services,
and products to the entertainment and media industries. Its sales reached 10.5 billion euros in
2001. It is the fourth-largest supplier in the world of consumer electronics products. Consumer
Electronics Association, at http://www.ce.org/publications/booksreferences/digital america/
video/analogtv.asp (last visited February 3, 2003).
65. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,984.
66. Id. at 15,984-85.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15,984-86.
70. Id. at 15,979.
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Receivers with screen sizes 13" to 24"-100% of all such units
must include DTV tuners effective July 1, 2007;
TV Interface Devices (videocassette recorders (VCRs), digital
versatile disk (DVD) players/recorders, etc.) that receive
broadcast television signals-100% of all such units must
include DTV tuners effective July 1, 2007. 7'
C. The All-Channel Receiver Act (ACRA)
The FCC regulates the television manufacturing arena pursuant to the
authority granted it by Congress in 1962, through the enactment of
ACRA.72 Although Congress ultimately delegated responsibility to the
FCC, the authority behind the Act can be traced back to Congress'
commerce power.73 Since its passage in 1962, ACRA has come into the
legislative and judicial arena on numerous occasions.
1. Legislative History of ACRA
The All-Channel Receiver Act (ACRA) came to life pursuant to a
congressional bill 74 which, once enacted, amended the Communications
Act of 1934. It gave the FCC the necessary authority to regulate television
receiver capabilities, namely, to require that they be equipped at the time of
manufacture to receive all television channels, including the seventy UHF
and twelve VHF channels. 75 Following significant debate regarding the
scope of the power granted to the FCC, ACRA was enacted, expressly
giving the FCC
[the] authority to require that apparatus designed to receive
television pictures broadcast simultaneously with sound be
capable of adequately receiving all frequencies allocated by the
Commission to television broadcasting when such apparatus is
shipped in interstate commerce, or is imported from any foreign
country into the United States, for sale or resale to the public.76
71. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,996.
72. All-channel Receiver Act of 1962, supra note 13.
73. See S. REP. NO. 87-1526 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1873, 1873
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
74. There were two identical bills: S. 2109 and H.R. 8031. They were introduced
respectively in the Senate by Senator Warren G. Magnuson and in the House of Representatives
by Representative Oren Harris pursuant to a request by the Federal Communications
Commission. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1873.
75. Id. at 1873; see also H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 2 (1962) [hereinafter HOUSE -REPORT].
76. All-channel Receiver Act, supra note 13.
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The above language was a product of an amendment, which inserted
the word "adequately" between "capable of' and "receiving."77  The
purpose of such an insertion was to ensure that the FCC not have blanket
authority to prescribe performance standards. 8
The Senate Report indicated that the Committee on Commerce, as
well as the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, conducted
"extensive hearings"7 9 on House of Representatives Bill 8031. 80 To
reinforce the desirability of this proposed legislation and to demonstrate the
broad spectrum of supporters, the congressional report referred to the
parties presenting testimony on this bill as "all segments of the broadcast
industry, manufacturers, Government agencies, and the general
public ... .,81 The House Report listed the supporters for the legislation as
the "broadcasting industry, including television networks,' 82 with the "most
enthusiastic support for this legislation. . . com[ing] from the thousands of
viewers who may be threatened with complete loss of television service if
the only available VHF service were to be discontinued and less far-
reaching UHF service substituted., 83 Following these hearings, the House
of Representatives passed H.R. Bill 803184 on May 2, 1962, by a vote of
279 to 90.85
2. The Underlying Purpose of ACRA
The Senate's primary considerations were the urgency and necessity
of a solution to the particular problems surrounding the inadequate use of
the UHF spectrum, reflected in its report on the decision to enact ACRA.86
The Senate Report first addressed the statutory mandate of the FCC,
namely, "to provide the people of the United States with a truly nationwide
and competitive broadcasting system. '8 7 The Report added that, although
the FCC had allocated sufficient space for a total of 2,225 television
77. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1879. This amendment to the proposed legislation
was adopted after congressional debate and pursuant to a dialogue with the FCC regarding the
scope of power envisioned under ACRA. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1873.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 8.
83. Id.
84. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1873.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1874-75.
87. Id. at 1874.
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stations for UHF and VHF channels, only 103 UHF channels were actually
on air.8 8 Since only seven percent of the potential UHF assignments were
in use, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce declared that
"[i]f the American people [were] to have the chance to enjoy the benefits of
television service to the fullest degree, then a major portion of the UHF
channels not now assigned must be put into operation."
89
The House Report further indicated that the production of television
sets capable of receiving UHF signals had actually slowed down.
90
According to the statistics presented before the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, "[i]n 1953 over 20 percent of the television
receivers were equipped at the time of manufacture to receive UHF. In
1961, only about six percent of the receivers produced were so equipped." 9 1
The Senate Committee noted that the scarcity of all-channel receivers
hindered effective competition between the UHF and the VHF stations.92
Additionally, of the licensees who have decided to switch to a UHF format,
one hundred were forced to give up and "go dark.,
93
Furthermore, the House Report indicated the ultimate goal to be "a
television system which will serve all the people, encourage local outlets,
foster competition-particularly in the larger markets-and meet
educational needs. 94  One of the problems the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee found with the system at that time was that the
allocation structure permitted a total of only three national networks.95
Thus, irrespective of the number of parties wishing to enter the field or the
amount of demand for additional network services, the allocation structure
at that time would not permit additional networks.96  The limitations
imposed by the allocation structure were thought to impede the
Committee's and the FCC's goal of a commercial television system
designed to
(1) be truly competitive on a national scale by making provision
for at least four commercial stations in all large centers of
88. Id.
89. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 2 (emphasis added). By comparison, the Senate noted
that the legislation's "basic purpose is to permit maximum efficient utilization of the broadcasting
spectrum space, especially that portion of the spectrum assigned to UHF television." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 73, at 1874.
90. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 2.
91. Id.
92. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1875.
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population; (2) provide at least three competitive facilities in all
medium-sized communities; and (3) permit all communities of
appreciable size to have at least one television station as an
outlet for local self-expression.97
3. The Legislative History of ACRA Clearly Sets Out the Scope of
Permissible Legislation
While recognizing the need for legislation which would give the FCC
the requisite regulatory power to create a solution to the problems
surrounding the UHF spectrum, the House and the Senate Committees
recognized that such a grant of power must be carefully tailored so as not to
exceed the necessary scope. 98 Thus, in enacting ACRA, both the House
and Senate Committees clearly stated their vision of the intended effects of
the statute as well as the scope of its application. 99 The House Report,
under a bold subheading reading "All-Channel Receiver Legislation Only
Means To Achieve Adequate Television System,"'100 explained that the
objective "of an adequate national television system can be achieved only
through the utilization of the 82 channels now allocated for television
broadcasting."' 0'1 It emphasized that more than twelve VHF channels were
necessary to meet the nation's needs. 10 2 The fact that only seven percent of
the available spectrum was used and that ninety-three percent was not,
resulted in an "inexcusable waste of one of the most valuable and limited
natural resources to which this Nation and other nations have access-the
radio spectrum." 0 3  Unless the public had television sets capable of
receiving UHF programming, the UHF broadcasters would have no
incentive to translate UHF programming.
10 4
In the absence of such programming, consumers in 1962 had no
incentive to pay a premium for television receivers -capable of receiving
UHF signals. 10 5  Congress needed to break this "vicious cycle"'1 6 by
97. Id.
98. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 73 (discussing the need for and scope of the
proposed legislation).
99. See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75 (discussing the need for and scope of the
proposed legislation); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 73.
100. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 4.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id.
104. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 5; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1876.
105. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1876.
106. Id.
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enacting appropriate legislation in order for the UHF television band to be
developed in the name of the public interest.107 Because all other feasible
approaches at breaking this cycle had failed, the Committee
"wholeheartedly agree[d] with the [FCC] that a long-range policy of
developing an 82-channel VHF and UHF television system should be
followed."' '
The House Report also addressed the issue of what it envisioned in
ACRA. The FCC would authorize all television sets shipped in commerce
to "be capable of receiving" both VHF and UHF channels. 10 9 The House
Report interpreted the quoted language to mean
that all receivers shipped in interstate commerce or imported
will be constructed with equipment inside its cabinet which will
have performance characteristics sufficient to permit satisfactory
and usable reception of each of the present 12 VHF and 70 UHF
channels in any location where, in the light of the normal state
of receiver development at the time, such reception can be
expected. The performance capabilities of such sets for
receiving UHF signals should be adequate to assure that the
purchasers of these sets will in fact get comparable reception
from UHF and VHF stations.110
Similarly, the Senate Report emphasized "that the aim of this measure
is an intermixed television system using both 12 VHF and 70 UHF
channels."' 11
There was substantial debate as to the breadth of ACRA, with
concerns voiced about the dangerous precedent that it might set in the
regulation of manufacturers. 1 2 One such opinion quoted Justice Brandeis:
"Experience teaches us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent."'" 3 The record indicates that the
FCC itself has recognized and addressed this concern. For example, the
FCC assured the Committee on Commerce "that the practical need for
procuring authority which would permit effective enforcement of this
legislation would not involve the Commission broadly in the dealings of
television set manufacturers."' 14 The Committee explained that the FCC's
107. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 5.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id.
111. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1879.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1881.
114. Id. at 1880.
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"authority, restrictive as it would be of section 303(s), would be most
limited and narrow."1"' Subsequent to the FCC's recognition of its limited
power under ACRA, the Committee on Commerce agreed with the FCC
that the legislation was "narrow in scope. 116
4. Interpretation of ACRA in Caselaw
Since its enactment, ACRA has been called into question several
times.117  Although few cases directly address DTV regulation, when
interpreted collectively, these cases provide a framework for analyzing the
power granted to the FCC under ACRA.
In Association of Maximum Service Telecasters v. FCC,'1 8 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed that the FCC's
regulatory authority is limited under ACRA. 119 The court examined the
limitations inherent in ACRA's language when Sanyo Manufacturing
Corporation manufactured a receiver, the Specific Signal Display Device
("SSDD"), incapable of receiving all FCC-allocated television
frequencies. 20  This device was intended for use with home computers,
video games, cable television systems, and video tape recorders.'
2'
Specifically, the SSDD differed from ordinary television receivers in that it
was capable of receiving only two VHF frequencies (channels 3 and 4),
enabling it to function with cable television or any other device that sends a
signal within the narrow two-channel range.122 Because the SSDD was not
capable of receiving all the channels prescribed by ACRA, Sanyo requested
a waiver from the FCC to allow Sanyo to market the SSDD in the United
States, which was subsequently granted. 2 3 The Association of Maximum
Service Telecasters ("Association") challenged the FCC's decision. The
Association contended that ACRA's meaning mandated that "any device,
such as the SSDD, 'capable' of receiving television pictures broadcast
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(affirming the FCC's determination that Sanyo's "specific signal display device" did not fall
within the terms of ACRA); Elec. Indus. Ass'n Consumer Elecs. Group v. FCC, 636 F.2d 689,
698 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (vacating the FCC's order establishing a 12dB standard for television tuners,
as it was based on faith, rather than fact).
118. 853 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
119. Id. at 981.
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simultaneously with sound"'
24 be required to comply with ACRA.
25
Granting the waiver, the FCC interpreted ACRA as applying only to
devices that are "intended for reception of over-the-air signals."'' 26 The
FCC reasoned that, because the SSDD was not intended to receive over-
the-air signals, the statute was inapplicable.1 27 The court of appeals agreed
with the FCC's more limited view of ACRA's language and ruled that the
FCC's grant of waiver to Sanyo was permissible.
28
In making its decision, the Association court went to great lengths to
decipher the legislative intent in the passage of ACRA1 29 To understand
the scope of ACRA, the court looked to the established guidelines for
statutory interpretation as originally enunciated in Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 130 In the Chevron two-part test,
the first prong analyzes a congressional statute and requires a court to ask
"whether Congress' intent is clear as to the precise question at issue."' 3' In
interpreting Congress' intent, the court must employ "traditional tools of
statutory construction.' 32 If the court determines that sufficient evidence
exists to support Congress' intent, then the congressional intention "is the
law and must be given effect."' 33 The Association court emphasized that,
although traditionally governmental agencies enjoy deference from the
courts, such deference will not "be applied to alter the clearly expressed
intent of Congress.
1 34
The second prong of the Chevron test requires that, if the examining
court determines that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question ... is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.' 35 In this case, the Association
court determined that Congress' intent on the precise issue was unclear and
went on to determine whether the agency's construction was "'reasonable'
124. Ass 'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters, 853 F.2d at 975 (emphasis added).
125. Id. Although the court failed to indicate why the Association of Maximum Service
Telecasters would want to contend the FCC decision, it is highly likely that some of the parties
whose interests it advocated stood to lose sales due to approval of Sanyo's product.
126. Id. (citing Mem. Op. and Order, FCC 84-261, at 4 (released July 20, 1984), J. A. at 24).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 981.
129. Id. at 978-81.
130. 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
131. Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters, 853 F.2d at 975.
132. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
133. Id. at 976 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
134. Id. (quoting Bd. of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368
(1986)).
135. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
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or 'permissible."' 1 36 In analyzing the FCC's interpretation of ACRA, the
court focused on the congressional intent, which seemed to be maximizing
the efficiency of the broadcast spectrum, particularly the UHF portion of
the spectrum. 137 The court reiterated that Congress sought to achieve
effective competition between UHF and VHF channels when it enacted the
statute. 138 The Association court saw the SSDD as
yet another one of those luxury items, what Justice Catron long
ago may have presciently had in mind when he spoke of "real or
supposed extravagance[s]"... that is to say, consumers who
suffer from limited wherewithal in this electronic age are
singularly unlikely to purchase an SSDD in lieu of a TV set.1
39
The Association court further agreed with the FCC's reasoning that
"[t]he logic and necessity of applying one set of technical standards does
not dictate the application of other technical standards to which logic and
necessity do not apply. ' 140 As a result, the court concluded that the FCC's
conclusion that the SSDD did not fall within the terms of ACRA was
reasonable under the Chevron guidelines.
a14
In Electronic Industries Ass'n Consumer Electronics Group v.
FCC,142 the court of appeals further scrutinized the statutory limits on the
FCC's regulatory authority under ACRA. The plaintiff, an electronics
manufacturer, disputed the FCC's authority under ACRA to impose certain
noise standards. 143 The FCC enacted these standards to improve the overall
performance of television receivers by regulating for higher sound
quality. 44 Thus, the issue turned on whether the FCC could set a television
tuner noise standard that was unattainable using existing technology.1
45
According to the court's findings, the FCC implemented the new noise
standard believing that this and other similar actions would lead to a
technical progress that would permit the televisions of the future to comply
with the newly-ordered requirement. 46 The court also noted that a factor
considered by the FCC was the "need for significant technical
136. Id. at 978 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 845).
137. Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters, 853 F.2d at 979 (quoting S. REP. No. 1526, 87th
Cong. (1962)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 980 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 981 (quoting Brief for FCC at 11 n.6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. 636 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 693-94.
144. Id. at 690.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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improvements to reach 12dB [the new minimum noise standard]."'
' 47
When considering the scope of the FCC's power, the court paid
particular attention to the legislative intent behind ACRA, as evidenced by
its legislative history. 48 Particularly important was language noting that
"all receivers ... be constructed with equipment inside its cabinet which
will have performance characteristics sufficient to permit satisfactory and
usable reception of each of the present 12 VHF and 70 UHF
channels .... In considering the validity of the noise standard
requirement, the court was mindful of the fact that ACRA was passed
primarily to integrate the UHF spectrum. 50 Additionally, the court noted
various other limitations on the FCC's legislative power under ACRA and
also noted the fact, admitted by the FCC, that the lower noise figure could
not currently be achieved without increasing the susceptibility to
interference while maintaining a reasonable cost. 151 The court, noting that
"faith is not enough" 151 and that the "mandate [of congressional
commission embodied in ACRA] does not authorize the Commission to go
beyond assuring 'adequate' UHF reception,"1 53 found that the FCC lacked
the authority to set standards for the future which the existing technology
cannot attain 154 and vacated the FCC's order.
1 55
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legislative History Demonstrates That ACRA Does Not Apply to DTV
and That the FCC Has No Authority Under ACRA to Regulate
As mandated under Chevron, where the language of a statute is
unclear, the principles of statutory interpretation require a careful look at
legislative intent.1 56 Accordingly, the language of ACRA should not be
147. Id. at 693. Two commissioners dissented during the adoption of this new standard.
Commissioner Robert E. Lee stated that he sees the 12dB standard as representing "wishful
thinking" which "does not [really] make it happen." Id. (citing UHF Television Receiver Noise
Figures, 69 F.C.C.2d 1866, 1885 (1978)).
148. See Elec. Indus. Ass 'n Consumer Elecs. Group, 636 F.2d at 694.
149. Id. (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75).
150. See id.
151. Id. at 697 (citing UHF Television Receiver Noise Figures, 70 F.C.C.2d 1176, 1180-81
(1978) (memorandum, opinion, and order)).
152. Id. at 698.
153. Id.
154. Elec. Indus. Ass "n Consumer Elecs. Group, 636 F.2d at 698.
155. Id.
156. See Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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read in isolation without taking into consideration the true motivations and
concerns of the legislators. Analyzing the circumstances surrounding the
enactment of ACRA will clearly demonstrate that it is simply not
applicable to DTV.
The Senate and House Reports clearly indicate the issues that
prompted the hearings and research that led to ACRA's enactment.157 The
House Report unambiguously states the dire need for an improved state of
broadcast television, namely, in the realm of increasing the number of
channels available to the general public. 158 By making the UHF spectrum
available to the general public, Congress tried to remedy a seriously-
fragmented allocation structure that limited competition.159 At the time,
"278 so-called television markets" broke down into the following
categories: 127 markets broadcasting only one television station, 70
markets broadcasting two stations, 57 markets broadcasting three stations
and 24 markets broadcasting four or more 'stations. 60 "Consequently,
under the television market term, almost three-fourths of the television
markets have a choice of one or two local stations.'
' 61
Congress saw these channels as too few-especially in light of the
available spectrum-to successfully promote the growth and development
of educational television. 62 It sought to remedy this by requiring all
television receivers to include the capability to receive all VHF and UHF
channels.1 63  In fact, ACRA itself was considered to be "educational
television legislation,"'1 64 aimed primarily at solving the current and future
needs of educational television, and not for making technological advances
in a system already capable of supporting educational television.
1 65
Furthermore, the Senate Report indicates that Congress passed this
legislation for the very narrow purpose of remedying the lack of television
stations available to the public due to the absence of UHF programming:
"We emphasize that the aim of this measure is an intermixed television
system using both 12 VHF and 70 UHF channels."'
166
157. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 73; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75.
158. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 2.




163. Id. at 1874.
164. Id. at 1875.
165. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1874.
166. Id. at 1879.
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B. The Debates Regarding the Amendment ofACRA Evidence a
Contraction of the Regulatory Authority It Imparts to the FCC
Perhaps some of the more compelling evidence for the limited scope
of ACRA comes from the amendment adopted pursuant to the initial
legislation. 67 Requiring that the word "adequately" be inserted between
"of' and "receiving" in the statute,' 68 Congress addressed the concern that
the original proposal (absent the word) would have given "the Commission
blanket authority to prescribed [sic] 'minimum performance standards' for
all television receivers shipped in interstate and foreign commerce.' 69 One
of the concerns was that such authority would give the FCC the permission
to "adopt standards covering the manufacture of color television
receivers."' 70  Consequently, the FCC itself agreed that the authority
granted it under House Bill 8035 was "broader than was necessary" and the
provision was amended. 17  The House Committee deleted the language
giving the FCC authority to mandate "minimum performance
capabilities"' 72 and limited the language of ACRA to the specific purpose
of insuring UHF reception capabilities. 73  Such a deletion of language
from a bill "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a
result that it expressly declined to enact.'
174
The Committee on Commerce further assuaged the Senators' fears
regarding what might appear as too broad a power granted to the FCC by
including in its report the FCC's own concession that it realized the
limitations of power granted under ACRA. 17 5 The FCC made assurances to
the Committee that "[tjhe authority given to the Commission to require
that all channel receivers 'be capable of adequately receiving' UHF





171. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1879.
172. See Elec. Indus. Ass'n Consumer Elecs. Group, 636 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(quoting All-Channel Television Receivers and Deintermixture: Hearings on H.R. 8031 Before
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1962)
(testimony of W. Walter Watts, RCA Corp.)).
173. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75, at 2.
174. Consumer Electronics Association, White Paper Regarding Television Tuner
Requirement, at 7 (2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov [hereinafter CEA White Paper]
(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974)).
175. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1880.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
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an intermixed system. 177 Consistent with the FCC's report, the current
version of ACRA was enacted. 178  The reiteration of the legislation's
limited power to remedy the UHF problem, and the FCC's own concession
that this is the range and limit of the powers granted it under ACRA,
demonstrate that nothing gave the FCC the far-reaching powers it usurped
in passing legislation mandating DTV phase-in.
Proponents of the FCC's current regulation might argue that certain
advances in technology and the general progress associated both with
equipment and broadcasting warrant the FCC's intervention in the DTV
realm. For instance, there were once concerns of ACRA being so broad as
to cover "the manufacture of color television receivers,"' 79 but currently,
the majority of TVs manufactured are in fact in color, 80 and yet the UHF
regulation still applies to them. Thus, in a sense, one could argue that the
natural progression of technology has been absorbed in the meaning of
ACRA.
Although such an interpretation could be made, it is merely facetious
and flouts the realities of the explicit limitations inherent in ACRA's
legislative history and in its express meaning. Once the intended
limitations of ACRA are realistically assessed, the following point remains:
The only way the matter addressed in the amendment could be justified is if
ACRA is interpreted to mean that Congress passed it solely to remedy the
specific VHF/UHF related problem and to extend ACRA no further.
Apart from the history of ACRA-which through creative
interpretation could permit the DTV regulation-there is explicit and
unambiguous evidence that the FCC simply does not have the power to
enact DTV regulation.'18  In 1997, Representative Edward Markey, the
ranking Member of the House Telecommunications and Internet
Subcommittee, proposed that the Communications Act be amended to
require that television receivers receive DTV signals,' 82 but this proposed
amendment was rejected on a roll call vote with a count of 31-11.183 In
addition, Jeff Sagansky, the President and CEO of Paxson Communications
177. Id. at 1879.
178. See generally id. (discussing the enactment of ACRA).
179. Id. at 1879.
180. Consumer Electronics Association, Analog TV Keeps Its Lead, at
http://www.ce.org/publications/books-references/digital_america/video/analog-tv.asp (last
visited February 3, 2003) (explaining a "98 percent penetration of color TV").
181. See CEA White Paper, supra note 174, at 8.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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Corporation, a strong proponent of the FCC's digital tuner phase-in plan,'
84
made the following statement to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation: "We need a digital All-Channel Receiver Act
that would require that all television sets sold to the American public be
capable of receiving both analog and digital signals."' 185  There is no
conceivable reason why the CEO of Paxson would ask the Senate
Committee to pass an act that would delegate to the FCC the requisite
power to enact DTV regulation if it already had this power under ACRA.
A digital ACRA was not passed and thus, the FCC has no authority to
regulate.
C. The Current Lack of Urgency Does Not Justify Extending ACRA to DTV
The FCC's regulation of television manufacturers in 1963, pursuant to
the passage of ACRA, should not be viewed in isolation. There was a
sense of urgency in the realm of broadcasting that prompted congressional
legislation to expand the FCC's power. 186 In addition, there was clear
evidence indicating that, absent congressional and, subsequently, FCC
intervention, the problem regarding the non-use of the UHF spectrum was
not going to be solved of its own accord. 87 Currently, with respect to the
DTV transition, there is no such evidence. This lack of urgency is
precisely why the FCC should forbear legislation, and instead let market
forces dictate the time and terms of progress.
Back in 1962, Congress could not hope for a natural, market-driven
transition to the UHF spectrum, as the figures indicated to the contrary.
88
Specifically, congressional findings indicated that in the nine-year span
beginning in 1953, the number of television receivers equipped to receive
UHF had dwindled: "In that year [1953], over 20 percent of television
receivers were equipped at the time of manufacture to receive UHF; by
1961 that percentage had declined to 6 percent."' 89 In effect, this prevented
an "effective competition between UHF and VHF stations."' 90 Currently
there is no such pressing issue of a lack of competition between the UHF
184. See Hearing on the Transition to Digital Television Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (written testimony of Jeff Sagansky,
President and CEO, Paxson Communications Corporation) (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1876.
187. Id.
188. See generally id. (discussing the need for legislative intervention in expanding the
broadcast spectrum).
189. Id. at 1875.
190. Id.
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and the VHF spectrum, which existed before the enactment of ACRA. The
issue before the FCC when it implemented the phase-in plan was not a lack
of programming as in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, the FCC's actions were
motivated by a desire to bring the public more technologically-advanced
television.191 This is not permissible under ACRA.
The competition among DTV, UHF, and VHF spectrums is
conspicuously not mentioned in the FCC's report outlining the necessity
for DTV. During ACRA's enactment, the declining manufacturing rates of
television receivers capable of UHF reception were clear evidence that,
absent congressional intervention, the integration of the UHF spectrum and
the goals associated with it were not going to happen.1 92 There is no such
evidence in the instance of the current transition to DTV. The current
manufacturing rates of DTV-ready receivers would only serve to compel
the FCC to abstain from regulation and to allow the natural force of
consumer demand to facilitate and guide the transition. 
193
FCC Commissioner Kevin J. Martin's dissenting opinion in the
Digital Television Order affirms the notion that market-based forces are
preferable to government intervention, particularly "when regulation
imposes a cost to consumers ... to purchase a product they may not
use."'194  Instead of ruling for the DTV transition, Martin said that the
Commission should focus on cable inter-operability and other cable
carriage issues, which are more likely to benefit consumers since seventy
percent of these consumers receive their television programming from
cable or satellite providers. 195 Emphasizing that if the government does
believe that it is necessary to interfere, "it must be clear that the benefits
outweigh the costs.'' 96 Martin is not persuaded that imposing the costs of
the transition on those who will not benefit from it is "the right step,"
because, even if the transition to digital is made, cable and satellite
consumers will probably wish to continue receiving their services from
191. Fourth Report and Order in MM Docket No. 87-268, 11 FCC Rcd. 17,771, 17,772-73
(1996).
192. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1875-76.
193. Consumer Electronics Association Press Room Release, DTV Product Sales Flourish
in July (Sept. 5, 2002) at http://www.ce.org/press-room/press-releasedetail.asp?id10024.
CEA president and CEO Gary Shapiro notes that "[t]he DTV transition, in terms of product sales,
is progressing at an astounding pace ... Compared to the same period last year, we have sold
nearly double the DTV products in 2002." Id. The press release adds the following projections:
"2.1 million DTV products-including integrated sets and displays-will be sold in 2002, 4
million in 2003, 5.4 million in 2004, 8 million in 2005 and 10.5 million in 2006." Id.
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cable and satellite.
97
In addition to the legislative intent expressed during the enactment of
ACRA, there is a substantive body of caselaw supporting the
inapplicability of ACRA to the present issue.
198
The proper standard for interpreting whether an administrative agency
has overstepped its regulatory authority was first enunciated as a two-prong
test in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel.199
According to this test, the initial inquiry is "whether Congress has
expressly spoken to the precise question at issue.,, 200  As applied to the
current circumstances, the "precise question at issue" is the order of the
FCC forcing the television manufacturers into a mandatory transition to the
DTV standard by including digital tuners in manufactured television sets.
Nothing in either the House or the Senate Report addresses this precise
question at issue.20' On the contrary, the issue addressed as being the
primary consideration in enacting ACRA is the adequate reception of the
UHF spectrum, with emphasis on the fact that this authority "given to the
Commission... [be] narrow in scope.,,202 DTV legislation, which would
allow the FCC to order the transition, was only discussed in 1997 when it
was defeated.0 3
Since Congress did not address DTV in enacting ACRA, the analysis
must proceed to the second prong of the Chevron test.20 4 The second prong
requires that if the court determines that "the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question [to be posed] ... is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.'2°5 In Perrin v. United States,2 °6 the Supreme Court asserted that,
"unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. ' '20 7 Therefore, the portion of
ACRA, which must be scrutinized under this standard, is the phrase "all
,,208frequency, as it is the present frequency of the broadcast, which shall be
197. Id.
198. Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
199. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
200. Id. at 842.
201. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 73; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 75.
202. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1880 (emphasis added).
203. See CEA White Paper, supra note 174, at 8 (citing House Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. Amendment to the Comm. Print of June 10, 1997 (offered by Rep. Markey)).
204. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
205. Id. at 843; see also Ass 'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters, 853 F.2d at 976.
206. 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
207. Id. at 42.
208. All-Channel Receiver Act of 1962, P.L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150 (1962).
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altered through the adoption of a DTV standard. °9 Without a doubt, even
the staunchest proponent of the DTV regulation would not argue that in
1962, when ACRA was enacted, its framers intended to include the
frequencies utilized in digital technology. Rather, the frequencies
discussed were UHF and VHF analog television signals, as expressly
affirmed in the Senate Report addressing all VHF and UHF channels.210
Thus it would be outside of the "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning" to include within the meaning of "all frequencies" the digital
signal which at the time was "mere science fiction." 21'1 The Electronic
Industries court emphasized that ACRA was adopted following the
Commission's commitment to "avoid extreme or unreasonable
performance specifications... [and] select standards which are in the
realm of the average characteristics of UHF receivers available on the open
market today. ' 21 2 Most UHF receivers are made to receive just that-UHF
signals. DTV is not UHF, and since "the logic and necessity of applying
one set of technical standards does not dictate the application of other
technical standards to which logic and necessity do not apply, 2 13 the FCC
should not impose a DTV standard which is outside the realm of ACRA.
D. DTV Phase-In Is Not Financially Viable to the Consumer
Consistent with the court's pronouncement in Association of
Maximum Service Telecasters v. FCC,214 a DTV tuner is nothing more than
"yet another one of those luxury items," and indeed, "consumers who
suffer from limited wherewithal [sic] in this electronic age' 2 15 are just as
unlikely to purchase a TV set with a DTV tuner as they are an SSDD,
which became the center of controversy in Association. Currently, DTV-
capable television sets are arguably only for the wealthy, and do not fall
within the language or the aims of ACRA.
The increase in price of a television set has troubled many groups and
individuals alike.216 While the FCC cites to studies proposed by Arthur D.
209. See Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,983-84, 1 13.
210. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 1874-76.
211. CEA White Paper, supra note 174, at 2 (quoting Report and Order (Separate
Statement of Comm'r Furchgott-Roth)).
212. Elec. Indus. Ass'n Consumer Elecs. Group, 636 F.2d at 696.
213. Ass 'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters, 853 F.2d at 981.
214. 853 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
215. Id. at 980.
216. FCC Mandates DTV Tuner; CEA to Appeal, T.V. DIGEST, Aug. 12, 2002. Some of the
groups opposing the mandate are "CFA, Consumer Action, Seniors Coalition, National Farmers
Organization, American Corn Growers [and] Cato Institute." Florida Consumer Action Network
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Little, Inc. ("ADL"),217 there are equally-reputable sources that indicate
profound flaws in ADL's assessment of future costs and projections.1 8 In
Electronic Industries, the issue turned on the fact that the FCC was
regulating In reliance on standards that were "not presently attainable with
existing technology. '219 In other words, the FCC was regulating in hopes
that technology would eventually evolve to fill its expectation. Despite the
FCC's assertion that there is "need for significant technical
improvements ' 20 in this area of regulation, the court ruled against the
Commission, noting that such expectation constituted "wishful thinking,"
which does not make it a reality.2
Until the FCC can ensure that market forces in combination with the
DTV regulation will lower prices of DTV-capable television sets to a range
that is within the grasp of the average consumer, it should abstain from
regulation. By passing the burden of achieving FCC-envisioned goals onto
the customer, the contemplated purpose of ACRA is frustrated, along with
the intentions of its framers.
Currently, the FCC's price projections are essentially based on faith
in the projected decline of DTV-component prices, and faith is not
enough.2  As mentioned in Part II above, MSTV, NAB, and Thomson
have commissioned studies to be conducted by economic assessing the
financial impact of the DTV regulation.223  Subsequently, both sides-
those supporting the regulation and those opposing it-submitted various
economist studies, purporting to predict or simply appraise the impact such
regulation would have on the market.224 MSTV and NAB submitted a
study by ADL which created estimates for the costs of integrating DTV-
states that "[a]ny such [DTV-carrying] requirement will raise the costs of television sets [and will
affect] large populations of elderly, immigrants, agricultural laborers, and poor rural families,
students and minorities." Id.
217. ADL is a management consulting firm with considerable experience in its field.
Arthud D. Little, Global Management Consulting, at http://www.adl.comldefault.asp (last visited
Feb. 3, 2003).
218. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,983-84, 13. See generally Letter from
David R. Siddall, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky, & Walker, LLP, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC (Aug. 1, 2002) (submitting "Comments of Coleman D. Bazelon and T. Christopher Borek
Relating to Arthur D. Little, Inc.'s Assessment of the Impact of DTV on the Cost of Consumer
Television Receivers," Analysis Group/Economics, at http://www.fcc.gov (last visited Feb. 3,
2003)) [hereinafter Bazelon Comments].
219. Elec. Indus. Ass 'n Consumer Elecs. Group, 636 F.2d at 690.
220. Id. at 693 (quoting UHF Television Receiver Noise Figures, 69 F.C.C.2d 1866, 1880
(1978) (report and order)).
221. Id. (quoting Comm'r Lee, dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Digital Television Order, supra note 5, at 15,983-84.
224. Id. at 15,982-84.
558 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:533
decoders into television sets, as well as projections purporting to indicate
how these costs would decline with time due to a larger volume of DTV
receiver sales.225 The ADL study projects that the cost of a baseline DTV-
capable receiver would decline from $380 in 2001, to between $195-$218
in 2006.226
Neither CEA nor Thomson agreed with such an optimistic projection,
and, in turn, submitted their own studies.227 CEA submitted a study by the
Analysis Group/Economics, which found substantial flaws with the ADL
Study.228 According to the Analysis Group Study, the first flaw in the ADL
study is that the projections failed to consider the effects that DTV
regulation will have on television prices, and, as a result, on overall
television sales.229 Additionally, the study noted that the ADL seems to
imply that "the number of televisions sold is invariant to the price of
televisions. '" 230 Such analysis contradicts the economic theory of the "Law
of Demand," which mandates that once the price of a product increases, the
225. Id. at 15,983-84.
226. Id. ADL has analyzed three varying scenarios of DTV transition:
1) a baseline case, where DTV receiver introduction is driven solely by market
forces; 2) a mandate case, where the government requires inclusion of a DTV
receiver in all new TV sets sold after January 1, 2004; and 3) a phased mandate
case, where the government would first require that high-end receivers include a
DTV receiver and then extend the requirement to include lower-end models over
time such that all new TV receivers sold in the year 2006 would have a DTV
receiver. The DTV capable receivers considered under each of these scenarios
would provide standard definition (SDTV) level quality of video service, with
initial prices of from $169 (high-end models) to $180 (low-end models) higher than
comparable analog receivers. Based on its assessment of costs and expected rate of
consumer acceptance of DTV (i.e., that DTV will be accepted at the same rate as
color television), the ADL Study finds that under the baseline case, DTV receiver
penetration would reach only 8.5% by 2006, with the price of a DTV capable
receiver about $35-38 higher than a comparable analog set. Under the mandate
case, DTV penetration would reach 75.5% by 2006 and 85%+ by 2007, with the
price of a DTV capable receiver about S 14-15 higher than a comparable analog set.
Under the phased mandate case, the ADL Study predicts that DTV penetration
would reach 65% by 2006 and 85% by 2007, with the price of a DTV capable
receiver about $15-16 more than a comparable analog set. With regard to
transverters (it assumes these devices can also receive cable service), the ADL
Study estimates that a DTV capable set-top box would cost approximately $380 in
2001, and by 2006 would decline to $218 under the baseline case and $195 under
the mandate case. Under the study's assumptions, the price of analog addressable
set-top boxes would be about $180. The ADL Study further concludes that the
retail prices of DTV capable receivers could be dramatically lower in the initial
years of production if manufacturers would adopt a "forward pricing" strategy.
Id.
227. See generally Bazelon Comments, supra note 218 (describing the shortcomings of the
ADL Study and the results of Bazelon and Borek's independent analysis).
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id.
230. See id.
2003] REGULATORY OVERREA CHING: PHASE-IN PLAN FOR DTV TUNERS 559
unit sales of the product decrease.231
The second flaw follows from the first. Specifically, because the
ADL Study overestimates the number of television sets to be sold once the
regulation is in place, its estimates of the subsequent decreases in price, due
to higher volume of sales, is also overstated and unrealistic. 232 The per-unit
costs tend to decline with an increase in volume; however, if high volume
is not achieved, a price decrease will not take place despite expectations.233
In other words, ADL overstates the decline in production costs, and,
subsequently, in television set prices as a result of the FCC's regulation. 4
The third shortcoming is that ADL assumes that doubling the sales of
television sets with digital decoders will reduce the decoder installation
cost by twenty-five percent, irrespective of how much time it takes for the
sales to double. 235 Analysis Group sees this figure as too narrow a view in
light of other factors influencing price, such as the amount of time required
to learn the best or most efficient way to integrate a digital receiver into a
television set. 6 Analysis Group does not believe that this amount of time
is directly related to sales volumes, and instead considers it an independent
factor.23 7 Thus, it sees the proposed reduction in cost of installing the
digital receiver into a television set as overly optimistic.
238
Finally, the fourth shortcoming of the ADL Study, as determined by
the Analysis Group Study, is that the study may understate the
manufacturers' costs of integrating digital receivers.2 39  Thomson's
findings, reflected in the Digital Television Order, support the Analysis
Group Study's comment on ADL understating the costs of integrating
240receivers.
The ADL and AGS studies disagree on various points, but they
diverge most on the ultimate cost to the consumer. The FCC's Digital
Television Order does not explicitly state which study it deems correct,
24'
nor does it cite any independent study completed on its own initiative.
Rather, the order avoids the debate altogether and simply stresses the need
231. See id.
232. Id. at 5.
233. Bazelon Comments, supra note 218, at 5-6.
234. Id.




239. Bazelon Comments, supra note 218, at 7.
240. Id. at 6.
241. See generally Digital Television Order, supra note 5 (resolving several issues
regarding DTV).
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for DTV service and its capability to receive it.24 2 However, electronics
manufacturers, who would seem to benefit from the regulation, also oppose
FCC intervention. For example, Mitsubishi Electric, one of the world's
largest producers of electronic equipment, submitted a letter to the FCC
declaring that, despite its expenditure of millions of dollars in direct grants
underwriting over-the-air HDTV broadcasts, it believes an Advanced
Television Systems Committee ("ATSC") tuner mandate "would result in a
fundamental resource misallocation and would harm most consumers, as
they would be forced to pay a premium for a feature they do not need or
use. ' ' 43  Focusing on the fact that TV antennas are dwindling in
numbers, 2 " while analog, cable TV, digital cable, prerecorded media, and
satellite antennas are growing, it would seem fruitless to regulate in this
realm as "no government tuner mandate will whip back this tide or cause
antennas to grow back on roofs. 24 5
Additionally, there is the issue of redundancy-a "cable tuner"
replicates the circuitry in a "TV" tuner, thus creating a redundancy in
having two components executing a similar function. 4 6 Unfortunately, due
to the additional security and performance features in a cable tuner, a cable
subscriber would still be required to rent a DTV-capable tuner from the
cable provider. Since digital cable subscribers must already pay for a
digital tuner, the mandatory inclusion of a digital tuner in television sets,
pursuant to the FCC's regulation, will create an unnecessary redundancy at
the consumer's expense.
247
Furthermore, DTV technology is simply a luxury, much like the SSDD,
which fell outside the scope of ACRA because the Commission was not
addressing technology which threatened the usefulness of the UHF
spectrum. As the FCC's report made clear,
[Congress'] concern was to remedy a situation where the UHF
television allocations were progressively being rendered less
useful because fewer and fewer television sets could receive
anything but the VHF channels. Here, we are not dealing with a
technology that poses any real threat directed particularly to the
242. See id. 34.
243. Letter from Robert A. Perry, Vice President, Marketing, Mitsubishi Electric,
Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America, Inc., to Hon. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with author).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2.
247. Id. Mitsubishi further insists that forcing manufacturers to include the digital decoder
will be "arbitrary and capricious" and might "even constitute an unconstitutional taking." Id. at 5.
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use of the UHF spectrum, but rather one that provides
consumers with a less expensive way to take advantage of the
general display capabilities of the cathode-ray tube.24 8
In the present case, the inclusion of a DTV tuner provides consumers
with a much more expensive way to utilize their cathode-ray tube, and
therefore, as in Association, the choice of whether to purchase this
technology or to dispense with it should be left up to the consumer rather
than the FCC. 249  To illustrate, a price increase of $200-$300 is quite
substantial. After all, if the FCC is really concerned with providing higher
quality television to viewers, then it should allow them to decide whether
or not the quality of television they watch needs improvement. In sum,
because television itself is a luxury, the consumer should be the one to
determine how much luxury he wants, and whether or not he wants to pay
for an upgrade.
E. The FCC Is Legislating Despite a Lack ofRequisite Power
The FCC has constructed an elaborate and seemingly feasible plan to
go from analog to digital.2 50  It has already distributed the digital channel,
and, along with Congress, is very anxious to reclaim and auction off the
analog spectrum. 25  Despite the FCC's anxiety, the transition has not been
smooth and, along with the "unique circumstances '2 52 surrounding the
transition, the FCC postponed the May 10, 2000 auction date for the
spectrum from channels 60-69 (upper 700 MHz band) five times.2
53
Without an auction, there are no sales, and, consequently, no profit is
generated. It seems likely that this state of affairs will force Congress to
pressure the FCC to take positive steps to reclaim the analog spectrum. The
revenue generated from the auction is expected to serve "as a measure to
248. Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters, 853 F.2d at 979 (quoting FCC's Mem. Op. and
Order, FCC 84-261, at 4 (released July 20, 1984), J.A. at 24, 31).
249. See generally id. (discussing the fact that Congress intended all televisions to have
access to UHF signals).
250. See discussion infra Part II.B.
251. Id.
252. Wiley, supra note 43, at 38. In its effort to facilitate the transition, the FCC is forced to
confront the fact that it may be several years until the bidders in a specified auction schedule will
be able to utilize the spectrum they are expected to buy. Id. Meanwhile, the FCC wants to ensure
that its potential bidders have enough time to develop their business plans along with their
bidding strategies. Id. Furthermore, to accommodate the full-power DTV stations, the FCC had
to displace secondary broadcast stations, which service smaller areas. Id. at 38-39. The FCC had
to provide relief to these displaced secondary stations. Id. at 39.
253. Id. at 38.
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reduce the budget deficit and to avoid spending cuts and tax increases.' ' 54
Additionally, there is the mystical way in which this DTV regulation
favors broadcasters. Already, broadcasters are essentially squatting on $70
billion worth of spectrum.255 As CEA president Gary Shapiro aptly noted, it
needs "no more [extra] favors. 256 Even FCC Chairman Powell conceded
that the "move was 'industrial policy.' '2 57 His concession leaves open the
question of why the additional costs are being imposed on the American
public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FCC may not legislate in any manner it sees fit merely because the
aspired goals are within the general realm of its authority. The above-
described transition is within the general legislative authority of the FCC,
insofar as it relates to spectrum regulation, which is a national asset.
However, the FCC's phase-in plan entails regulation of television
manufacturers, which are private entities, and thus the plan requires the FCC
to have a specific grant of power.258 ACRA was one such specific grant of
power, in that it explicitly permitted the FCC to achieve a system of
intermixed television using both the VHF and UHF channels. On the other
hand, this is where the power to regulate under ACRA ends.
Thus, as the extensive amount of factual data indicates, there is
254. Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday 's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's
Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 772 (1998).
Auctions were not always the norm. The reality is that they faced "years of opposition.., by
powerful congressional barons and the broadcast industry." Id. In fact,
[a]round the world, countries aim to advance the national infrastructure. In the
United States, there seems to be a widespread agreement that this should be done
without government money. But the spectrum sales end up as the opposite of
making public investments. Through auctions, the United States has been taking
money away from infrastructure-providing private firms and throwing it into the
black hole of the budget deficit. For decades, America's telecommunications
system was superior to that of other countries, often because these countries used
telecommunications as a cash cow for general government expenses. Now we have
embarked on the same road, just as other countries have left it at our urging.
Id. at 773.
255. CEA Opposes FCC Mandate of DTV Tuners, APPLIANCE, Oct. 2002, at 19, available
at LEXIS, News Library, All.
256. FCC Orders Set Manufacturers to Include DTV Tuners by 2007, AUDIO WEEK, Aug.
12, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, All.
257. FCC Orders Set Manufacturers to Include DTV Tuner, 24 PUBLIC BROADCASTING
REP., Aug. 23, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, All.
258. See generally Digital Television Order, supra note 5 (discussing the FCC's DTV
phase-in plan).
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simply no permissible excuse for the FCC regulation mandating the DTV
phase-in plan. The regulation contravenes the express intentions of
ACRA's framers, exceeds the FCC's authority under ACRA, imposes an
additional government tax on television sets, and is not wanted by
consumers. For these reasons, either the FCC or the judiciary needs to halt
this outrageous regulation.
Eugene Rome*
* With infinite love and gratitude to my parents, Robert and Lydia Rome.

